Renegotiation Proof Equilibria in Continuous Time Games

James Bergin and W. Bentley Macleod ()

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper develops a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information. This model bridges the gap between the differential formulation of a continuous time game and the procedure of taking limits with respect to discrete time games. The model admits a large class of strategies. As a result, the set of equilibria is large -- roughly equal to the set given by the folk theorem. In addition, we define the concept of renegotiation proof equilibrium in this context and characterize the set of renegotiation proof equilibria of the game.

Keywords: game theory; information; economic models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1989
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Working Paper: RENEGOTIATION-PROOF EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS TIME GAMES (1989)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:753

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