Anonymous Sequential Games with Aggregate Uncertainty

James Bergin and Dan Bernhardt

Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper extends the results of Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988) on the existence of equilibrium in anonymous sequential games. They prove existence in the case where the aggregate distribution of agents' characteristics evolves nonstochastically -- the case of "no aggregate uncertainty". We show how aggregate uncertainty can be introduced to the model and extend the Jovanovic-Rosenthal existence theorem to this case.

Keywords: game theory; uncertainty; stochastic processes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1989
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Journal Article: Anonymous sequential games with aggregate uncertainty (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:760

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