Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation

Robin Boadway and Michael Keen

No 828, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Using the self-selection approach to tax analysis, this paper derives a modified Samuelson Rule for the provision of public goods when the government deploys an optimal non-linear income tax. This approach gives a straightforward interpretation of the central result in this area, generalizes it , and provides a simple characterization of optimal policy in a wide range of circumstances.

Pages: 14 pages
Date: 1991-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_828.pdf First version 1991 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:828

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