The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy

Klaus Stegemann

No 834, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: In many ways, the international regulation of dumping looks like a model of successful multilateral rule making. Yet the systemic justification of anti-dumping measures is dubious, and international rule making has perversely served to expand the scope for regulatory protection. The multilaterally agreed rules have made protection too easy, as compared to the standards that are used to regulate predatory behavior under domestic competition laws and as compared to the standards stipulated for safeguard measures under Article XIX of the GATT. This paper also explores the reasons why the deregulation of dumping will be difficult

Pages: 56 pages
Date: 1991-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_834.pdf First version 1991 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy (1991)
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