Entry Deterrence

Roger Ware ()

No 837, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper surveys the recent literature on strategic entry deterrence. Particular attention is paid to limit pricing, entry deterrence models using a two-stage framework, incomplete information treatments of entry deterrence and entry deterrence as a framework for modeling the determination of market structure. In addition there is some discussion of antitrust issues.

Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1991-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_837.pdf First version 1991 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:837

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