Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy

Robin Boadway, Nicolas Marceau and Maurice Marchand

No 860, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Time inconsistency of tax policy is shown to arise in a setting in which households differ in their ability to accumulate wealth and the government has redistributional objectives. The government can levy non-distorting taxes but is precluded from redistributing optimally by a self-selection constraint. The analysis is done for the case in which all wealth is human capital, and education is a private good. An argument can be made for public intervention in the provision of education.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1992-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_860.pdf First version 1992 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Investment in education and the time inconsistency of redistributive tax policy (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:860

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Babcock (babcockm@queensu.ca).