Incomplete Enforcement with Endogenous Regulatory Choice

Devon Garvie and Andrew Keeler

No 873, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper extends the economics literature on the incomplete enforcement of social regulation by incorporating regulatory choice in an institutional environment of limited regulatory resources and powers. We show how regulatory decisions determine the structure of incentives faced by regulated firms. Our results indicate that the expense of monitoring relative to the regulator's power to levy penalties helps to explain the differences between "compliance" and "deterrence" enforcement styles. We find that in most circumstances firms with higher abatement costs will receive a larger share of regulatory resources and thus face higher penalties than firms with lower costs.

Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1993-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Downloads: (external link)
http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/working_papers/papers/qed_wp_873.pdf First version 1993 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choice (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:873

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Babcock ().