Unskilled Workers In An Economy With Skill-biased Technology

Shouyong Shi

No 987, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper contributes to the search theory of unemployment by endogenously deriving matching functions and surplus sharing rule for skilled and unskilled workers from a wage-posting game. In contrast to previous wage posting models, here both sides of the market are heterogeneous and the resulted matching function can exhibit non-constant returns to scale. The model provides useful explanations for the observed dynamic patterns of within-skill and between-skill wage differentials in the 1970s and 1980s.

Keywords: Wage differential; Matching; Wage posting; Technological progress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J31 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 1999-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_987.pdf First version 1999 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Unskilled workers in an economy with skill-biased technology (1999)
Working Paper: Unskilled Workers in an Economy with Skill-Biased Technology (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:987

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark Babcock ().