Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Conflict Funding

Valpy FitzGerald

QEH Working Papers from Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

Abstract: Interdiction of terrorist funds has become a priority for intergovernmental cooperation. Logically, this initiative should affect SDM financing as well as conflict funding more generally - particularly where incumbent states can outlaw such movements. However, multilateral and unilateral attempts to ensure timely reporting of transactions made by targeted individuals or groups, and to deny them access to the international financial system, have had limited success. This is mainly due to economic disincentives for the disclosure of the identity and purpose of transacting agents, particularly those using correspondent banking services, informal money transfer networks and offshore financial centres. Solutions should be based on positive incentives for disclosure, and could include trans-border withholding taxes on transactions with unregulated clients and the provision of affordable transfer systems for emigrants. But this in turn would require a clear and practicable definition of the 'right to self-determination' in terms of international jurisdiction.

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