Coasian Dynamics in Repeated English Auctions

Flavio Menezes and Matthew J. Ryan

No 349, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We extend the Coase conjecture to the case of a seller with a single object, who faces n potential buyers and holds a sequence of English auctions until the object is sold. In an independent-private-values environment in which buyers and sellers share the same discount factor, we show that the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium path of reserve prices obeys a Coasian logic. Moreover, the equilibrium reserve path lies below that for the model of repeated sealed-bid, second-price auctions studied by McAfee and Vincent (1997). Nevertheless, the open (English) and sealed-bid formats are shown to be revenue equivalent.

Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:349

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