When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests

Marco Faravelli and Luca Stanca

No 412, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: This paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy. We consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest with proportional probabilities, where all bidders value the prize equally. We show that by fixing the number of tickets, thus setting a limit to total expenditures, it is possible to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue and obtain (almost) full rent dissipation. We test this hypothesis with a laboratory experiment. The results indicate that, as predicted, revenue is significantly higher in a lottery with rationing than in a standard lottery. On the other hand, an alternative rationing mechanism that does not limit total expenditures fails to increase revenue relative to a standard lottery.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests (2012)
Working Paper: When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:412

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