Optimal Access Regulation with Downstream Competition

Flavio Menezes, John Quiggin and Tina Kao

No 473, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the setting of access prices for a bottleneck facility where the facility owner also competes in the deregulated downstream market. We consider a continuum of market structures from Cournot to Bertrand. These market structures are fully characterized by a single parameter representing the intensity of competition. We first show how the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) should be modified as the downstream competitive intensity changes. We then analyse the optimal access price where a regulator trades off production efficiency and pro-competitive effects to maximize total surplus.

Date: 2012-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/45753/473.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal access regulation with downstream competition (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal access regulation with downstream competition (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:473

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SOE IT ().