Caps on Coasean Transfers

Ian MacKenzie and Markus Ohndorf

No 485, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when transfers between agents are capped. We model a two-stage Coasean environment where, in the first stage, property rights are costly to attribute. After the attribution stage agents voluntarily exchange over the level of harm. If property rights are attributed via an all-pay auction, then the introduction of a cap is Pareto improving. Using a Tullock contest we find a cap is Pareto inferior, but may increase Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Applications include the analysis of tort law.

Date: 2013-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Caps on Coasean transfers (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:485

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