Public-Private Partnerships for Transport Infrastructure: Some Efficiency Risks

Matthew Ryan and Flavio Menezes
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Matthew Ryan: The University of Auckland

No 499, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: This paper models a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) to construct a highway. It captures some of the key features of the Transmission Gully PPP. The winner of the tender recovers its costs (including capital costs) via an availability payment rather than toll revenue. While the availability payment eliminates demand risk, the winner of the tender faces cost risk: maintenance costs are only learned after construction is complete. The winning firm can make investments during the construction phase that reduce subsequent maintenance costs. As the government faces transaction costs to replace the successful bidder, firms use debt strategically to pass on some of the cost risk to the government. This distorts incentives to invest in maintenance cost reduction. Private financing therefore undermines some of the benefits from bundling construction and maintenance, which is often mentioned as an important advantage of PPPs.

Date: 2014-02-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm, nep-pub and nep-tre
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https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/45880/499.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Public-private partnerships for transport infrastructure: Some efficiency risks (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:499

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