A model of benchmarking regulation: revisiting the efficiency of environmental standards
Ian MacKenzie () and
Markus Ohndorf ()
No 519, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics
The conventional economic argument favors the use of market-based instruments over â€˜command-and-controlâ€™ regulation. This viewpoint, however, is often limited in the description and characteristics of the latter; namely, environmental standards are often portrayed as lacking structured abatement incentives. Yet contemporary forms of command-and-control regulation, such as standards stipulated via benchmarking, have the potential to be efficient. We provide a first formal analysis of environmental standards based on performance benchmarks. We show, in a variety of contexts, that standards can provide efficient incentives to improve environmental performance.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-reg and nep-res
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Journal Article: A Model of Benchmarking Regulation: Revisiting the Efficiency of Environmental Standards (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:519
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