Signalling quality with posted prices

Peyman Khezr and Abhijit Sengupta
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Abhijit Sengupta: School of Economics, University of Sydney

No 532, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We study a game in which the seller of an indivisible object wants to sell her object to a finite number of potential buyers with a posted price. The environment is such that the seller has some private information about the quality of the object that cannot be communicated with buyers at zero cost. We focus on the separating equilibrium of this game in which the seller signals her actual type via the posted price. The conditions of the existence and the uniqueness of this equilibrium are studied. In an example, we calculate the seller’s expected payoff at this equilibrium and further discuss some comparative statistics.

Date: 2014-09-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ger and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:532

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