An efficient and implementable auction for environmental rights
Peyman Khezr () and
Ian MacKenzie ()
No 587, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics
This article proposes a simple and efficient auction design to allocate environmental rights, such as tradable pollution permits. We show that if the auctioneer limits the number of bids that each buyer submitsâ€”coupled with a simple ex-post supply adjustment ruleâ€”then truthful bidding is obtained. Consequently, the uniform-price auction becomes efficient and revenue superior to conventional uniform-price auctions that are currently observed in pollution markets.
Keywords: auctions; multi-unit; uniform-price; efficiency, pollution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 L10 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:587
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