Primaries, Strategic Voters and Heterogenous Valences

Shino Takayama (), Yuki Tamura and Terence Yeo ()
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Terence Yeo: School of Economics, The University of Queensland, https://economics.uq.edu.au

No 605, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a two-party model of policy promises and valence for office-seeking candidates under a two-stage electoral process with strategic voters. There are two equilibrium regimes depending on whether a good quality candidate of one party can win elections at both stages with certainty. We then provide the conditions for the existence of each equilibrium regime. We further analyze the case where only one party holds a primary, and conduct comparative statics analyses including how the change of public opinion affects equilibrium outcomes. Using a modified model including the decision of each candidate on entering the primary, we also show that if a low quality candidate places less importance on policy outcomes, and the good quality candidate in the opponent party has sufficiently low valence relative to the good quality candidate in her own party, she does not enter. This is because her entry will potentially damage the probability of her party winning the general election.

Keywords: primary election; median voter; uncertainty; valence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-05-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/46380/605.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Primaries, Strategic Voters and Heterogeneous Valences (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:605

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