Price Spikes in Electricity Markets: A Strategic Perspective

Joseph Mullins, Liam Wagner and John Foster ()

No 5, Energy Economics and Management Group Working Papers from School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia

Abstract: This paper aims to analyze the issue of price spikes in electricity markets through the lens of noncooperative game theory. The case we consider is Australia’s long established National Electricity Market (NEM). Specifically, we adapt von der Fehr and Harbord’s multi-unit auction model to settings that more closely reflect the structure of the NEM, showing that price spikes can be related to a specifiable threshold in demand.

Keywords: Electricity Markets; Spot Price Behaviour; Non-Cooperative Game Theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 Q40 Q47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-gth and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uqeemg:05

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