On "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preference" by A. Rubinstein, Z. Safra & W. Thomson

Marco Mariotti

No 303, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Date: 1993-07-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:303

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