Optimal Ownership Structures in Asymmetric Joint Ventures

Paul Belleflamme and Francis Bloch

No 411, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: This paper investigates the relation between asymmetries in the distribution of shares in joint ventures and asymmetries between the parent companies. When the joint venture and the parent companies are controlled by separate entities, we provide a simple formula to compute the optimal ownership structure. This formula is applied to various models of market interaction, showing that larger companies should have a larger fraction of shares, and so should companies whose goods are closer substitutes of the product of the joint venture, or companies who have a higher cost of transformation of the input produced by a joint venture.

Keywords: Joint ventures; Strategic alliances; Ownership structure; Asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:411

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