Anonymous Price Taking Equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with Unbounded Club Sizes

Nizar Allouch, John Conley and Myrna Wooders

No 556, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We introduce a model of a local public goods economy with a continuum of agents and jurisdictions with finite, but unbounded populations. Under boundedness of per capita payoffs we demonstrate nonemptiness of the core of the economy. We then demonstrate that the equal treatment core coincides with the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes with anonymous prices - that is, prices for public goods depend only on observable characteristics of agents. Existence of equilibrium follows from nonemptiness of the core and equivalence of the core to the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our approach provides a new technique for showing existence of equilibrium in economies with a continuum of agents.

Keywords: Tiebout; Clubs; Jurisdictions; F-core; Core-equilibrium equivalence; Edgeworth equivalence; Continuum economies with clubs; Crowding types; Core; Equal treatment core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:556

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