Two-stage Bargaining Solutions

Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti

No 572, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a particular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica, 1997) of an extension of the Nash axioms and solution to domains including non-convex problems, as well as a complete characterizations of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality, Covariance with positive affine transformations, and Independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Keywords: Bargaining; Non-convex problems; Nash bargaining solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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