Uncovered Bargaining Solutions

Michele Lombardi and Marco Mariotti

No 608, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: An uncovered bargaining solution is a bargaining solution for which there exists a complete and strict relation (tournament) such that, for each feasible set, the bargaining solution set coincides with the uncovered set of the tournament. We provide a characterization of a class of uncovered bargaining solutions.

Keywords: Bargaining; Tournaments; Uncovered set; Non-convex problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09-01
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Journal Article: Uncovered bargaining solutions (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:608

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