Whom to Lobby? Targeting in Political Networks

Thomas Groll and Anja Prummer

No 808, Working Papers from Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance

Abstract: We study lobbying in a setting in which decision-makers share resources in a network. Two opposing interest groups choose which decision-maker they want to target with their resource provision, and their decision depends on the decision-makers' ideologies as well as the network structure. We characterize the lobbying strategies in various network settings and show that a higher resource flow as well as homophily reinforce decision-makers' ideological bias. We highlight that competing lobbyists' efforts do not neutralize each other and their payoffs and competitive advantages depend on the networks they face. Our findings are consistent with empirically established lobbying activities.

Keywords: Networks; Lobbying; Targeting; Flow of resources; Ideology; Centrality; Homophily; Colonel Blotto; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:808

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