Money Doctors

Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor?s perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average under perform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.

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http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/node/228501

Related works:
Journal Article: Money Doctors (2015)
Working Paper: Money Doctors (2014)
Working Paper: Money Doctors (2012)
Working Paper: Money Doctors (2012)
Working Paper: Money doctors (2012)
Working Paper: Money Doctors
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