Theory of Indiscriminate Violence

Yuri Zhukov

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: Why do governments use indiscriminate violence against civilians? To deter a population from rebelling, a government should make rebellion costlier than neutrality. Yet indiscriminate violence can make neutrality costlier than rebellion. If indiscriminate violence causes previously passive actors to rebel, why do governments use it? With the help of mathematical modeling, archival data and micro-comparative evidence from dozens of armed conflicts, I show that combatants use indiscriminate violence because it works ? just not in moderation. Indiscriminate violence makes civilians less likely to remain neutral, but not necessarily more likely to support the opponent. There is a threshold level of violence, beyond which it becomes safer for civilians to cooperate with the more indiscriminate side. As long as civilians believe that supporting the rebels will be costlier than supporting the government, they will generally not rebel ? even if the government is responsible for more civilian deaths overall. The amount of violence needed to meet this threshold depends on the government? relative informational endowment. If a combatant has the information to selectively punish her opponents, she can employ a relatively low level of violence. Where she lacks the information for selective punishment, she will use methods more indiscriminate in targeting and more massive in scale. Violence is a substitute for intelligence.

Date: 2014-01
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