Liquid Bundles

Emmanuel Farhi and Jean Tirole

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: Parties in financial markets, industries, compensation design or politics may negotiate on either a piecemeal or a bundled basis. Little is known about the desirability of bundling when values are common and/or information endogenous. The paper shows that bundling encourages information-equalizing investments, thereby facilitating trade. It accordingly revisits and qualifies existing knowledge on security design.

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http://scholar.harvard.edu/farhi/node/70971

Related works:
Journal Article: Liquid bundles (2015)
Working Paper: Liquid Bundles (2013)
Working Paper: Liquid Bundles (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qsh:wpaper:70971

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