Status-Seeking In Coalitional Matching Problems

Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov

No 10-02, Economics Working Papers from Queen's Management School, Queen's University Belfast

Abstract: We study group formation where agents’ preferences over group memberships are defined on the identity of the other agents in the same group. We define identity to be two-dimensional: on the one-hand, it is determined by the agent’s type, e.g., her race, nationality, ethnic background; on the other hand, it is determined by the agent’s quality, e.g., her skill level or material endowment. Specifically, we consider two types of agents and view group formation as a coalitional two-sided matching problem where agents of each type may form coalitions which can be matched to each other. Agents’ preferences are dictated by status-seeking. Status can be either local or global. In this setting, we consider four specific preference domains, show that on all of them core stable coalitional matchings always exist, and fully characterize the corresponding cores.

Keywords: Coalitions; Core; Stability; Two-sided matchings (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2010-02
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