Mise en œuvre des Paiements pour Services Environnementaux: Utilités d’un questionnement juridico-économique ?
Michel Pech and
No 19-02, Working Papers SMART from INRAE UMR SMART
[paper in French]. Facing budgetary restrictions, public environmental policies are turning to innovative schemes that meet objectives of results, a better adequacy of actions in the territories will allow access to new sources of financing, especially private ones. This is reflected at European level by a desire to move towards more contractualisation (CAP 2020). It is in this context that the payments for environmental services (PES) appear in France as an attempt to modernize the agri-environmental policy, aiming at looking for a "fairer" payment for the farmers but also seeking a greater efficiency environmental. At the same time, many innovative financing tools are being developed (crowdfunding platforms, local complementary currencies, etc.) to respond to a growing desire of local actors to become involved in environmental decisions and to reclaim the use of their investments in a more equitable economy. From this observation, we have been able to draw an empirical model of PES implementation based on a concrete case (Breton agribusiness) that works. On the other hand, if contract law allows a simple and flexible implementation of adequate agri-environmental actions, it implies: i) An upward collective logic around a territorial project ii) A match between explicit local supply and demand for environmental services (ES) iii) A regulator to organize the marketing of ES (place of negotiation, communication and information) iv) To assess the compatibility between private and public payments (WTO rules)
Keywords: payments for environmental services (PES); agri-environment; innovative financing; contract law; environmental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K1 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rae:wpaper:201902
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