Reverting to Informality Unregistered Property Transactions and the Erosion of the Titling Reform in Peru
Italo Gutierrez and
Oswaldo Molina ()
No WR-1156-1, Working Papers from RAND Corporation
Titling programs have focused mostly on providing initial tenure security and have not properly addressed maintaining the formality of future property transactions. Our data indicates that properties become de-regularized due to unregistered transactions in urban slums, which threatens to undo the success of the titling program in the long run. We exploit a natural experiment provided by the elimination of a streamlined registration system targeted for the poor residents in Peru to identify how costly and burdensome registration policies can increase de-regularization. Our analysis indicated that the elimination of such a system led to a significant reduction in the probability of registering transactions, including those that involved a change in ownership. Overall, our findings stress the necessity of building specific components aimed at maintaining properties formal into the design of urban titling programs.
Keywords: titling programs; registration; property transactions; property rights; natural experiment; Peru (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K0 O18 P14 R20 R28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-dev, nep-iue and nep-law
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Journal Article: Reverting to Informality: Unregistered Property Transactions and the Erosion of the Titling Reform in Peru (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ran:wpaper:wr-1156-1
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