Seasonal Scarcity and Sharing Norms
No 115, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
How does scarcity affect individual willingness to share and willingness to enforce sharing from others? Sharing in poor communities gains importance as an insurance mechanism during adverse shocks, yet shocks make it costlier to share. I conducted repeated economic experiments in both a lean and a relatively plentiful post-harvest season with the same group of Afghan subsistence farmers experiencing annual seasonal scarcities. I separate altruistic motives from enforcement effects using dictator and third party punishment games. While altruistic sharing remains temporally stable, the enforcement of sharing weakens substantially in times of scarcity. Temporal norms fluctuations seem to drive the results.
Keywords: afghanistan; scarcity; seasonality; sharing; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D63 I32 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ias
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Working Paper: Seasonal Scarcity and Sharing Norms (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:115
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