Selling Dreams: Endogenous Optimism in Lending Markets
Luc Bridet and
Additional contact information
Luc Bridet: University of St Andrews
Peter Schwardmann: LMU Munich
No 238, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders’ contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, the borrower’s motivated cognition increases her material welfare, regardless of whether or not she ends up being optimistic in equilibrium. Our model thus helps explain why wishful thinking is not driven out of markets. Second, in line with empirical evidence, a low cost of lending and a booming economy lead to optimism and the widespread collateralization of loans. Third, equilibrium collateral requirements may be inefficiently high.
Keywords: optimal expectations; motivated cognition; wishful thinking; financial crisis; lending markets; screening (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 D82 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cfn
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:238
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Viviana Lalli ().