Robust Contracting in General Contract Spaces
Patrick Beissner and
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Julio Backhoff-Veraguas: University of Twente
Patrick Beissner: Australian National University
Ulrich Horst: HU Berlin
No 242, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
We consider a general framework of optimal mechanism design under adverse selection and ambiguity about the type distribution of agents. We prove the existence of optimal mechanisms under minimal assumptions on the contract space and prove that centralized contracting implemented via mechanisms is equivalent to delegated contracting implemented via a contract menu under these assumptions. Our abstract existence results are applied to a series of applications that include models of optimal risk sharing and of optimal portfolio delegation.
Keywords: robust contracts; nonmetrizable contract spaces; ambiguity; financial markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:242
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