Bargaining and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study
Wooyoung Lim () and
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Jeongbin Kim: National University of Singapore
Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch: HU Berlin
No 254, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various confounds, we then test comparative statics predictions with respect to time discounting. All bargaining takes place within a single experimental session, so bargaining delay is negligible and dynamic consistency holds by design, while payoff delay per disagreement round is significant and randomized transparently at the individual level (week/month, with/without front-end delay). In contrast to prior experiments, we obtain strong behavioral support for the basic predictions that hold regardless of the details of discounting. Testing differential predictions of different forms of discounting, we strongly reject exponential discounting in favor of present-biased discounting.
Keywords: alternating-offers bargaining; time preferences; present bias; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-ore and nep-sea
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Working Paper: Bargaining and Time Preferences: An Experimental Study (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:254
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