Mechanism Design with Partially Verifiable Information

Roland Strausz

No 45, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: In mechanism design with (partially) verifiable information, the revelation principle holds if allocations are modelled as the Cartesian product of outcomes and verifiable information, giving rise to evidence-contingent mechanisms. Consequently, incentive constraints characterize the implementable set. The revelation principle does not hold when an allocation is modelled as only an outcome so that mechanisms are non-contingent. Yet, any outcome implementable by an evidence-contingent mechanism is implementable by a non-contingent mechanism, provided it can both extend and restrict reporting information. A type-independent bad outcome implies the latter property.

Keywords: revelation principle; mechanism design; verifiable information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-08-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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