Repression, Exit, and Dissent in an Autocracy

Max Deter, Kalle Kappner and Hans Lueders
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Max Deter: Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Kalle Kappner: LMU Munich, HU Berlin
Hans Lueders: Stanford University

No 587, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Does repression silence dissent or push people to leave? We study the arrest of protesters during East Germany's Peaceful Revolution, using novel micro-data from Leipzig. Residents of streets and houses with an arrested protester were more likely to have left their address once the Berlin Wall fell, and exit visa applications rose in the months after an arrest. Nearby protest activity and support for the opposition show no visible decline after an arrest. Our results suggest that repression raised the demand for exit without a visible retreat of voice, and that residents acted on this demand once leaving became possible.

Keywords: protest; repression; emigration; exit visas; east germany; autocratic breakdown (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 N44 P20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:587

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