Individual Differences and Contribution Sequences in Threshold Public Goods
Michael Schüssler and
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Katharina Schüssler: LMU Munich
Michael Schüssler: LMU Munich
Daniel Mühlbauer: function(HR)
No 88, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Following the notion that organizations often face public good dilemmas when collective action is needed, we use a real-time provision-point mechanism to experimentally explore the process of achieving cooperative equilibria. Specifically, besides exploring group outcomes, we identify individual antecedents for the timing of the contribution to the public good. In addition, we study the role of different situational factors for sustaining high rates of cooperation: information about others\' actions and the number of individuals necessary for public good provision. We find that contribution and implementation rates are relatively high, with only a moderate decline over time, and that social value orientation as well as several personality traits help to explain the observed contribution sequences.
Keywords: provision-point mechanism; real-time protocol; personality traits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pub
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:88
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