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Efficient Implementation with Interdependent Valuations and Maxmin Agents

Yangwei Song
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Yangwei Song: Humboldt University Berlin

No 92, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu show that efficient and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms generally do not exist. In this paper, we extend the standard model to accommodate maxmin agents and obtain necessary as well as sufficient conditions under which efficient allocations can be implemented. In particular, we derive a condition that quantifies the amount of ambiguity necessary for efficient implementation. We further show that under some natural assumptions on the preferences, this necessary amount of ambiguity becomes sufficient. Finally, we provide a definition of informational size such that given any nontrivial amount of ambiguity, efficient allocations can be implemented if agents are sufficiently informationally small.

Keywords: efficient implementation; ambiguity aversion; multidimensional signal; interdependent valuation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2018-04-23
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