Instruments of Monetary Policy
Bernardino Adao () and
Isabel Correia ()
No 164, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
How can a particular allocation and prices be implemented? Under what conditions does a policy deliver a unique competitive equilibrium? How many degrees of freedom there are in the determination of the policy variables, or how many are the instruments of policy? In this paper we analyze a standard dynamic general equilibrium monetary model and determine the conditions on fiscal and monetary policy under which there is single equilibrium. We first obtain that in general, when taxes are chosen in order to satisfy the government budget constraint for all prices and quantities, policy must include exogenous rules for both money supply and interest rates in order for there to be a single equilibrium. However, there are particular interest rate feedback rules, or money supply rules, that guarantee a unique equilibrium. We consider alternative fiscal policy rules and extend the analysis to environments with sticky prices. We obtain similar results for particular restrictions on the setting of prices
Keywords: monetary policy; indeterminacy; sticky prices; interest rate rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E31 E41 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed004:164
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