Bank Runs and Investment Decisions Revisited
Todd Keister and
Huberto Ennis
No 180, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
Abstract:
In this paper we extend the Cooper and Ross (1998) analysis of the optimal response of a competitive bank to the possibility of a bank run. If the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show that, in this case, the bank will hold a quantity of liquid assets large enough to exactly meet withdrawal demand if a run does not occur; "excess" liquidity will not be held. This result allows us to determine how the possibility of a bank run affects the level of long-term investment chosen by a bank. We show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high, the level of investment is decreasing in the probability of a run. However, when liquidation costs are smaller, the level of investment is actually increasing in the probability of a run.
Keywords: Bank; runs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E42 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://ciep.itam.mx/~keister/BRID.html main text (text/html)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://ciep.itam.mx/~keister/BRID.html [302 Found]--> https://gente.itam.mx/keister/BRID.html)
Related works:
Journal Article: Bank runs and investment decisions revisited (2006) 
Working Paper: Bank runs and investment decisions revisited (2004) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed004:180
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().