Path Dependence, Uneven Industrialization and Special Interests

Rui Zhao and Stephen Parente (parente@illinois.edu)

No 273, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper puts forth a theory to explainwhy special interest groups are more prevelant in some countries. Its thesis is that uneven industrialization facilitates the formation of special interest groups with monopoly control over factor supplies. An uneven industrial structure is both an artifact of underdevelopment in a country due to a history of high innovation costs, and a feature of society that further impeded development via its effect on the creation of special interest groups. In this sense, slow development sows a seed for slower development. We argue that the theory is potentially useful for explaining the fall in the median growth rate of developing nations since 1980

Keywords: Special Interests; Economic Development; Industrialization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-dev and nep-dge
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.business.uiuc.edu/parente/Parente-Zhao.pdf main text (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.business.uiuc.edu:80 (No such host is known. )

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed004:273

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann (chuichuiche@gmail.com).