Identification and Estimation in Sequential Dutch Auctions

Harry Paarsch and Bjarne Brendstrup

No 340, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Within the independent private-values paradigm, assuming asymmetric bidders,using the principle of dynamic programming, and employing the notion of Bayes-Nash equilibrium, we demonstrate nonparametric identification of the data-generating process of the sequence of winning prices at multi-unit, sequential, oral, descending-price (Dutch) auctions. Subsequently, we propose estimators of the distribution of latent valuations. We implement our framework using a sample of data from sequential, Dutch auctions of flowers held in Aarhus, Denmark. Using the estimated distributions in conjunction with simulation methods, we then undertake the policy experiment of comparing the outcomes at Dutch auctions with those that would obtain were Myerson's optimal auction employed

Keywords: identification; estimation; sequential Dutch auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 D44 L1 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed004:340

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann (chuichuiche@gmail.com).