Unions and the political economy of immigration
Carlotta Berti Ceroni () and
Giorgio Bellettini ()
No 494, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics
To study the political economy of immigration, we develop a common agency model where a trade union and a lobby of entrepreneurs offer contributions to the government to influence its decision on how many immigrants can enter the domestic economy. In the political equilibrium, anticipating that the union will use its power to raise the wage rate above the competitive level, the government sets the level of immigration above the socially optimal one. In this case, the union would be better off by foregoing its power on wage determination and engaging exclusively in the lobbying activity
Keywords: Immigration; unions; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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