Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Finance

Martin Hellwig

No 659, 2004 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: The paper studies the role of income taxes and admission fees in financing excludable and nonexcludable public goods in a large economy. A renegotiation proofness condition makes the multidimensional Bayesian mechanism design problem tractable. Resulting formulae for optimal income taxes and admission fees are compared to the corresponding Mirrlees-Seade income tax and Ramsey-Boiteux public-sector pricing conditions.

Keywords: Public; Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H41 H42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed004:659

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