Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment:Public versus Private Provision

Tim Worall and Jonathan Thomas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tim Worrall

No 158, 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Keywords: Social Insurance; Moral Hazard; Limited Commitment; Unemployment Insurance; Crowding Out. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 H31 H55 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ias and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision (2007)
Working Paper: Unemployment Insurance under Moral Hazard and Limited Commitment: Public versus Private Provision (2002)
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