Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Stephen Morris and George Mailath

No 25, 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Keywords: repeated games; private monitoring; almost-public monitoring; coordination; bounded recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring (2006)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2006)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2005)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004)
Working Paper: Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (2004)
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