Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities

Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa ()

No 866, 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Keywords: Optimal Auctions; Multiple Objects; Externalities; Mechanism Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/skreta/research.htm main text (text/html)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed005:866

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().