Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities

Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa ()

No 866, 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Keywords: Optimal Auctions; Multiple Objects; Externalities; Mechanism Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/skreta/research.htm main text (text/html)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design for Multiple Objects with Externalities (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed005:866

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().