Local Supermodularity and Unique Assortative Matching

Jan Eeckhout

No 127, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We consider sufficient conditions for uniqueness in two-sided matching models with transfers. We analyse the strategy-proofness of allocation mechanism

Keywords: Two-sided; Matching.; Uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:127

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