Knowing what others Know: Coordination motives in information acquisition

Christian Hellwig and Laura Veldkamp

No 361, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit strategic complementarity as well: If an agent wants to do what others do, then they want to know what others know. Likewise, strategic substitutability in actions produces strategic substitutability in information acquisition. The uniqueness or multiplicity of coordination game equilibria depends on whether information choice is discrete or continuous and whether the information is public or private. We use these results to explore how optimal information choices change the dynamic predictions of well-known macroeconomic theories.

Keywords: Costly Information Acquisition; strategic complements; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition (2009)
Working Paper: Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition (2007)
Working Paper: Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:361

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